Jane's Airport Review: Opinion - Critics of biometric ID testing are looking through the wrong end of the telescope

22 December 2008

Arguments against UK airport staff trials of biometric ID cards are illogical, says David McIntosh

Opposition to the recent government initiative on airport staff identity checks is both saddening and surprising.

Facial biometrics can bring significant benefits to the airport security environment. It is certainly hard to see why people working in that area should object to a face recognition trial. Surely the positive biometric identification of staff that go airside must be an obvious positive measure, to be welcomed by ground staff, aircraft crew and general public alike?

Having taken great care with detailed background checks to ensure that applicants for jobs in this area are honest and reliable, it would seem sensible to make sure that the identity tags, PIN numbers or passwords that verify their authenticity are in fact in the right hands; that they are in the possession of their rightful owner as they pass through into critical airside areas.

Without biometric identity verification, it is possible to pick up or steal an ID badge, card or radio frequency tag and gain illegal access to sensitive areas. The offender in such cases effectively steals not only the identity badge but the identity itself - acting illegally and very probably extremely dangerously while hidden beneath the honest identity of someone else.

In the days when fingerprints were the only practical biometric verifier, objections to the use of such systems were understandable. Many people feel uncomfortable having their prints taken.

Also, since our fingerprints are on almost everything we touch, they can themselves be stolen and used. Another serious disadvantage of identity-checking systems based on fingerprints is that any imposter, using a faked or stolen fingerprint, may go through without ever revealing their true identity. Their own true fingerprint is not recorded.
So, since we know that an identity card alone is a hopelessly insecure approach to the problem, and since we know that fingerprints are unreliable and PIN numbers and passwords are also pretty much a dead loss if high security is what you need, how do we make sure that people actually are who they say they are? How do we make effective use of biometric techniques in everyday applications where identity checking is important for the safety and security of us all? The UK government's answer is to try facial biometrics - and all in all this looks like a very sensible idea.

Modern facial biometric identity-checking systems are non-intrusive, easy to use and have no 'criminal' connotations. They create a computer-based mimic of everyday personal recognition of family and friends - by recognising a familiar face - and systems are non-contact.
The fact that a picture is taken means that a record can be made of people seeking access, whether or not such access is granted. In the case of repeated unsuccessful attempts to gain entry, an alarm can be raised; and security staff will know who they're looking for, because they have a photograph to guide them.

Despite these advantages, sadly, a hue and cry is being raised against biometric ID cards at airports on the grounds that such a thing is an unwarranted interference with individuals' rights. This is a seriously misguided position.

The staff concerned and the general public who rely on them have a clear common interest in doing the best we can - all of us, working together - to avoid appalling events such as Lockerbie and 9/11. Any initiative that strengthens our defences or bridges a weak link in the chain must surely be greatly welcomed.

The government has recognised that airside access control must be tightened. Recruitment procedures are being made more stringent, and background checks of individual applicants for jobs in this critical area are becoming more detailed. Having done that, it must surely be a wise precaution to equip them with positive biometric identity verification to make sure that only genuine staff gain access and imposters are unmasked, excluded and detained.

In the trial systems, staff simply have to present their ID card to a reader, glance into a camera lens and have their identity checked. The door, gate or barrier then springs open. The whole process takes less than two seconds, so it can hardly be thought of as a serious inconvenience. What it adds to the overall level of security is significant and much to be welcomed.

And yet, objections are being raised against even the trialling of these systems. Everything to do with identity verification seems to be stolen away from rational debate and paraded as a human rights issue. Of course human rights are important and well worth preserving - their assertion and protection are hallmarks of our ancient democracy. But we will not preserve these rights by creating obstacles to improved airport security under the false guise of specious personal freedoms.
Perhaps there is some confusion in people's minds about who and what is being checked by a facial biometric system. It is not the staff members who are under scrutiny. They are already trusted members of the airside team. The facial biometric system is not meant to check up on them. It is there to check up on their identity card - to make sure that it has not fallen into the wrong hands, being used to give a potential criminal or terrorist free access airside under the protection of someone else's ID.

If improved security for airside access looks like the unwarranted interference of Big Brother, then it is almost certainly being viewed through the wrong end of the telescope. We need to start looking through the right end. The only people who need fear facial biometric systems are the criminals and terrorists they will deter and exclude.

David McIntosh is a director of the Security Innovation Technology Consortium, and is also Chief Executive Officer of UK technology company OmniPerception.